

Enforcement of (Timed) Properties with Uncontrollable Events

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Abstract. This paper deals with runtime enforcement of untimed and timed properties with uncontrollable events. Runtime enforcement consists in modifying the executions of a running system to ensure their correctness with respect to a desired property. We introduce a framework that takes as input any regular (timed) property over an alphabet of events, with some of these events being uncontrollable. An uncontrollable event cannot be delayed nor intercepted by an enforcement mechanism. Enforcement mechanisms satisfy important properties, namely soundness and compliance - meaning that enforcement mechanisms output correct executions that are close to the input execution. We discuss the conditions for a property to be enforceable with uncontrollable events, and we define enforcement mechanisms that modify executions to obtain a correct output, as soon as possible. Moreover, we synthesize sound and compliant descriptions of runtime enforcement mechanisms at two levels of abstraction to facilitate their design and implementation.

1 Introduction

Verifying a user-provided specification at runtime consists in running a mechanism that assigns verdicts to a sequence of events produced by an instrumented system w.r.t. a property formalizing the specification. This paper focuses on *runtime enforcement* (cf. [21,15,12,13,3]) which goes beyond pure verification at runtime and studies how to react to a violation of specifications. In runtime enforcement, an enforcement mechanism (EM) takes a (possibly incorrect) execution sequence as input, and outputs a new sequence. Enforcement mechanisms should be *sound* and *transparent*, meaning that the output should satisfy the property under consideration and should be as close as possible to the input. When dealing with timed properties, EMs can act as *delayers* over the input sequence of events [19,17,18]. That is, EMs buffer input events for some time and then release them in such a way that the output sequence of events satisfies the property.

Motivations. In this paper, we focus on online enforcement of properties with uncontrollable events. Introducing uncontrollable events is a step towards more realistic runtime enforcement. As a matter of fact, uncontrollable events naturally occur in many

applications scenarios where the EM has no control over certain input events. For instance, certain events from the environment may be out of the scope of the mechanism at hand. This situation arises for instance in avionic systems where a command of the pilot has consequences on a specific component. In this domain, it is usual to add control mechanisms to check the validity of an event on particular points according to observations. For instance, the “spoiler activation”⁵ command decided by the pilot is sent by the panel to a control flight system, and this leads finally to a specific event on the spoilers. Placing an EM directly on the spoiler permits to avoid incoherent events, according to the pilot commands (which are events out of the scope of the EM). In the timed setting, uncontrollable events may be urgent messages that cannot be delayed by an enforcement mechanism. Similarly, when a data-dependency exists between two events (e.g., between a *write* event that displays a value obtained from a previous *read* event), the first *read* event is somehow uncontrollable as it cannot be delayed by the enforcement mechanism without preventing the *write* event to occur in the monitored program.

Challenges. Considering uncontrollable events in the timed setting induces new challenges. Indeed, enforcement mechanisms may now receive events that cannot be buffered and have to be released immediately in output. Since they influence the satisfaction of the property under scrutiny, delays of controllable events stored in memory have to be recomputed upon each uncontrollable event. Moreover, the occurrence of such events has to be anticipated, meaning that all possible sequences of uncontrollable events have to be considered by the enforcement mechanism. Thus, new enforcement strategies are necessary for both untimed and timed properties.

Contributions. We introduce a framework for runtime enforcement of regular untimed and timed properties with uncontrollable events. It turns out that the usual notion of transparency has to be weakened. As we shall see, the initial order between uncontrollable and controllable events can change in output, contrary to what is prescribed by transparency. Thus, we propose to replace transparency with a new notion, namely *compliance*, ensuring that the order of controllable events is maintained while uncontrollable events are output as soon as they are received. We define a property to be enforceable with uncontrollable events when it is possible to obtain a sound and compliant enforcement mechanism for any input sequence. It turns out that a property may not be enforceable because of certain input sequences. Intuitively, enforceability issues arise because some sequences of uncontrollable events that lead the property to be violated cannot be avoided. We give a condition, represented by a property, that indicates whether soundness is guaranteed by the enforcement monitor or not, depending on the input given so far. We describe enforcement mechanisms at two levels of abstraction. The synthesized enforcement mechanisms are sound and compliant whenever the previously mentioned condition holds.

Outline. Section 2 introduces preliminaries and notations. Sections 3 and 4 present the enforcement framework with uncontrollable events in the untimed and timed settings, respectively, where enforcement mechanisms are defined at two levels of abstraction. Section 5 discusses related work. Section 6 presents conclusions and perspectives.

⁵ The spoiler is a device used to reduce the lift of an aircraft.

2 Preliminaries and Notation

Untimed notions. An *alphabet* is a finite set of symbols. A *word* over an alphabet Σ is a sequence over Σ . The set of finite words over Σ is denoted Σ^* . The *length* of a finite word w is noted $|w|$, and the *empty word* is noted ϵ . Σ^+ stands for $\Sigma^* \setminus \{\epsilon\}$. A *language* over Σ is any subset $\mathcal{L} \subseteq \Sigma^*$. The concatenation of two words w and w' is noted $w.w'$ (the dot could sometimes be omitted). A word w' is a *prefix* of a word w , noted $w' \preceq w$ if there exists a word w'' such that $w = w'.w''$. The word w'' is called the *residual* of w after reading the prefix w' , noted $w'' = w'^{-1}.w$. The word w'' is then called a *suffix* of w . Note that $w'.w'' = w'.w'^{-1}.w = w$. These standard definitions are extended to languages in the natural way. Given a word w and an integer i such that $1 \leq i \leq |w|$, we note $w(i)$ the i -th element of w . Given a tuple $e = (e_1, e_2, \dots, e_n)$ of size n , for an integer i such that $1 \leq i \leq n$, we note Π_i the projection on the i -th coordinate, i.e. $\Pi_i(e) = e_i$. Given a word $w \in \Sigma^*$ and $\Sigma' \subseteq \Sigma$, we define the *restriction* of w to Σ' , noted $w|_{\Sigma'}$, as the word $w' \in \Sigma'$ whose letters are the letters of w belonging to Σ' in the same order. Formally, $\epsilon|_{\Sigma'} = \epsilon$ and $\forall \sigma \in \Sigma^*, \forall a \in \Sigma, (w.a)|_{\Sigma'} = w|_{\Sigma'}.a$ if $a \in \Sigma'$, and $(w.a)|_{\Sigma'} = w|_{\Sigma'}$ otherwise.

Automata. An *automaton* is a tuple $\langle Q, q_0, \Sigma, \rightarrow, F \rangle$, where Q is the set of states, called *locations*, $q_0 \in Q$ is the initial location, Σ is the alphabet, $\rightarrow \subseteq Q \times \Sigma \times Q$ is the transition relation and $F \subseteq Q$ is the set of accepting locations. Any location in F is called accepting. Whenever there exists $(q, a, q') \in \rightarrow$, we note it $q \xrightarrow{a} q'$. Relation \rightarrow is extended to words $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$ by noting $q \xrightarrow{\sigma.a} q'$ whenever there exists q'' such that $q \xrightarrow{\sigma} q''$ and $q'' \xrightarrow{a} q'$. Moreover, for $q \in Q$, $q \xrightarrow{\epsilon} q$ always holds. An automaton $\mathcal{A} = \langle Q, q_0, \Sigma, \rightarrow, F \rangle$ is *deterministic* if $\forall q \in Q, \forall a \in \Sigma, (q \xrightarrow{a} q' \wedge q \xrightarrow{a} q'') \implies q' = q''$. \mathcal{A} is *complete* if $\forall q \in Q, \forall a \in \Sigma, \exists q' \in Q, q \xrightarrow{a} q'$. A word w is *accepted* by \mathcal{A} if there exists $q \in F$ such that $q_0 \xrightarrow{w} q$. The language (i.e. set of all words) accepted by \mathcal{A} is noted $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A})$. A *property* is a language over an alphabet Σ . A regular property is a language accepted by an automaton. In the sequel, we shall assume that a property φ is represented by a deterministic and complete automaton \mathcal{A}_φ .

Timed languages. Let $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ be the set of non-negative real numbers, and Σ a finite alphabet of actions. An event is a pair $(t, a) \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \times \Sigma$. We define $\text{date}(t, a) = t$ and $\text{act}(t, a) = a$ the projections of events on dates and actions respectively. A *timed word* over Σ is a word over $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \times \Sigma$ whose real parts are ascending, i.e. σ is a timed word if $\sigma \in (\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \times \Sigma)^*$ and $\forall i \in [1; |\sigma| - 1], \text{date}(w(i)) \leq \text{date}(w(i + 1))$. $\text{tw}(\Sigma)$ denotes the set of timed words over Σ . For a timed word $\sigma = (t_1, a_1).(t_2, a_2) \dots (t_n, a_n)$ and an integer i such that $1 \leq i \leq |\sigma|$, t_i is the time elapsed before action a_i occurs. We naturally extend the notions of *prefix* and *residual* to timed words. We note $\text{time}(\sigma) = \text{date}(\sigma(|\sigma|))$, and define the *observation* of σ at time t as the timed word $\text{obs}(\sigma, t) = \max_{\preceq}(\{\sigma' \mid \sigma' \preceq \sigma \wedge \text{time}(\sigma') \leq t\})$. We also define the remainder of the observation of σ at time t as $\text{nobs}(\sigma, t) = (\text{obs}(\sigma, t))^{-1}.\sigma$. The *untimed projection* of σ is $\Pi_\Sigma(\sigma) = a_1.a_2 \dots a_n$, it is the sequence of actions of σ with dates ignored. σ *delayed* by $t \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ is the word noted $\sigma +_t t$ such that t is added to all dates: $\sigma +_t t = (t_1 + t, a_1).(t_2 + t, a_2) \dots (t_{|\sigma|} + t, a_{|\sigma|})$. We also extend the definition of the restriction of σ to $\Sigma' \subseteq \Sigma$ to timed words, such that $\epsilon|_{\Sigma'} = \epsilon$, and for $\sigma \in \text{tw}(\Sigma)$

and (t, a) such that $\sigma.(t, a) \in \text{tw}(\Sigma)$, $(\sigma.(t, a))|_{\Sigma'} = \sigma|_{\Sigma'}.(t, a)$ if $a \in \Sigma'$, and $(\sigma.(t, a))|_{\Sigma'} = \sigma|_{\Sigma'}$ otherwise. A *timed language* is any subset of $\text{tw}(\Sigma)$. Moreover, we define an order on timed words: we say that σ' *delays* σ , noted $\sigma \preceq_d \sigma'$, whenever $\Pi_{\Sigma}(\sigma') \preceq \Pi_{\Sigma}(\sigma)$ and $\forall i \in [1; |\sigma| - 1]$, $\text{date}(\sigma(i)) \leq \text{date}(\sigma'(i))$. Note that the order is not the same in the different constraints: σ' is a prefix of σ , but dates in σ' exceed dates in σ . We also define a *lexical order* \preceq_{lex} on timed words with identical untimed projections, such that $\epsilon \preceq_{\text{lex}} \epsilon$, and for two words σ and σ' such that $\Pi_{\Sigma}(\sigma) = \Pi_{\Sigma}(\sigma')$, and two events (t, a) and (t', a) , $(t', a).\sigma' \preceq_{\text{lex}}(t, a).\sigma$ if $t' < t \vee (t = t' \wedge \sigma' \preceq_{\text{lex}} \sigma)$.

Consider for example the timed word $\sigma = (1, a).(2, b).(3, c).(4, a)$ over the alphabet $\Sigma = \{a, b, c\}$. Then, $\Pi_{\Sigma}(\sigma) = a.b.c.a$, $\text{obs}(\sigma, 3) = (1, a).(2, b).(3, c)$, $\text{nobs}(\sigma, 3) = (4, a)$, and if $\Sigma' = \{b, c\}$, $\sigma|_{\Sigma'} = (2, b).(3, c)$, and for instance $\sigma \preceq_d (1, a).(2, b).(4, c)$, and $\sigma \preceq_{\text{lex}}(1, a).(3, b).(3, c).(3, a)$.

Timed automata. Let $X = \{X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n\}$ be a finite set of *clocks*. A *clock valuation* is a function ν from X to $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$. The set of clock valuations for the set of clocks X is noted $\mathcal{V}(X)$, i.e., $\mathcal{V}(X) = \{\nu \mid \nu : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}\}$. We consider the following operations on valuations: for any valuation ν , $\nu + \delta$ is the valuation assigning $\nu(X_i) + \delta$ to every clock $X_i \in X$; for any subset $X' \subseteq X$, $\nu[X' \leftarrow 0]$ is the valuation assigning 0 to each clock in X' , and $\nu(X_i)$ to any other clock X_i not in X' . $\mathcal{G}(X)$ denotes the set of guards consisting of boolean combinations of simple constraints of the form $X_i \bowtie c$ with $X_i \in X$, $c \in \mathbb{N}$, and $\bowtie \in \{<, \leq, =, \geq, >\}$. Given $g \in \mathcal{G}(X)$ and a valuation ν , we write $\nu \models g$ when for every simple constraint $X_i \bowtie c$ in g , $\nu(X_i) \bowtie c \equiv \text{true}$.

Definition 1 (Timed automaton [1]). A *timed automaton (TA)* is a tuple $\mathcal{A} = \langle L, l_0, X, \Sigma, \Delta, G \rangle$, such that L is a set of locations, $l_0 \in L$ is the initial location, X is a set of clocks, Σ is a finite set of events, $\Delta \subseteq L \times \mathcal{G}(X) \times \Sigma \times 2^X \times L$ is the transition relation, and $G \subseteq L$ is a set of accepting locations. A transition $(l, g, a, X', l') \in \Delta$ is a transition from l to l' , labelled with event a , with guard defined by g , and with the clocks in X' to be reset.

The semantics of a timed automaton \mathcal{A} is a timed transition system $\llbracket \mathcal{A} \rrbracket = \langle Q, q_0, \Gamma, \rightarrow, F_G \rangle$ where $Q = L \times \mathcal{V}(X)$ is the (infinite) set of states, $q_0 = (l_0, \nu_0)$ is the initial state, with $\nu_0 = \nu[X \leftarrow 0]$, $F_G = G \times \mathcal{V}(X)$ is the set of accepting states, $\Gamma = \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \times \Sigma$ is the set of transition labels, each one composed of a delay and an action. The transition relation $\rightarrow \subseteq Q \times \Gamma \times Q$ is a set of transitions of the form $(l, \nu) \xrightarrow{(\delta, a)} (l', \nu')$ with $\nu' = (\nu + \delta)[Y \leftarrow 0]$ whenever there is a transition $(l, g, a, Y, l') \in \Delta$ such that $\nu + \delta \models g$, for $\delta \geq 0$.

A timed automaton $\mathcal{A} = \langle L, l_0, X, \Sigma, \Delta, G \rangle$ is *deterministic* if for any (l, g_1, a, Y_1, l'_1) and (l, g_2, a, Y_2, l'_2) in Δ , $g_1 \wedge g_2$ is unsatisfiable, meaning that only one transition can be fired at any time. \mathcal{A} is *complete* if for any $l \in L$ and any $a \in \Sigma$, the disjunction of the guards of all the transitions leaving l and labeled by a is valid (i.e., it evaluates to true for any clock valuation).

A run ρ from $q \in Q$ is a valid sequence of transitions in $\llbracket \mathcal{A} \rrbracket$ starting from q , of the form $\rho = q \xrightarrow{(\delta_1, a_1)} q_1 \xrightarrow{(\delta_2, a_2)} q_2 \dots \xrightarrow{(\delta_n, a_n)} q_n$. The set of runs from q_0 is noted $\text{Run}(\mathcal{A})$ and $\text{Run}_{F_G}(\mathcal{A})$ denotes the subset of runs accepted by \mathcal{A} , i.e. ending in a state in F_G . The *trace* of the run ρ previously defined is the timed word




Fig. 1: A property and its corresponding precondition property of enforceability

$(t_1, a_1).(t_2, a_2) \dots (t_n, a_n)$, with, for $1 \leq i \leq n$, $t_i = \sum_{k=1}^i \delta_k$. Thus, given the trace $\sigma = (t_1, a_1).(t_2, a_2) \dots (t_n, a_n)$ of a run ρ from a state $q \in Q$ to $q' \in Q$, we can define $w = (\delta_1, a_1).(\delta_2, a_2) \dots (\delta_n, a_n)$, with $\delta_1 = t_1$, and $\forall i \in [2, n], \delta_i = t_i - t_{i-1}$, and then $q \xrightarrow{w} q'$. To ease the notation, we will only consider traces and note $q \xrightarrow{\sigma} q'$ whenever $q \xrightarrow{w} q'$ for the previously defined w . Note that to concatenate two traces σ_1 and σ_2 , it is needed to delay σ_2 : the concatenation σ of σ_1 and σ_2 is the trace defined as $\sigma = \sigma_1.(\sigma_2 +_t \text{time}(\sigma_1))$. Thus, if $q \xrightarrow{\sigma_1} q' \xrightarrow{\sigma_2} q''$, then $q \xrightarrow{\sigma} q''$.

Timed properties. A *regular timed property* is a timed language $\varphi \subseteq \text{tw}(\Sigma)$ that is accepted by a timed automaton. For a timed word σ , we say that σ *satisfies* φ , noted $\sigma \models \varphi$ whenever $\sigma \in \varphi$. A *regular timed property* is a timed language accepted by a timed automaton. We only consider deterministic and complete regular timed properties.

Given an automaton \mathcal{A} such that Q is the set of states of $\llbracket \mathcal{A} \rrbracket$ and \rightarrow its transition relation, and a word σ , we note q *after* $\sigma = \{q' \in Q \mid q \xrightarrow{\sigma} q'\}$ for $q \in Q$. We note $\text{Reach}(\sigma) = q_0$ *after* σ . These definitions are valid in both the untimed and timed cases. We extend these definitions to languages: if L is a language, q *after* $L = \bigcup_{\sigma \in L} q$ *after* σ and $\text{Reach}(L) = q_0$ *after* L .

3 Enforcement Monitoring of Untimed Properties

In this section, φ is a regular property defined by a complete and deterministic automaton $\mathcal{A}_\varphi = \langle Q, q_0, \Sigma, \rightarrow, F \rangle$. The purpose of an *enforcement mechanism* (EM) for φ is to modify the executions of a running system, represented by words so as to satisfy φ . It takes as input a word, representing an execution, and outputs a word, i.e. an execution. We consider uncontrollable events in the set $\Sigma_u \subseteq \Sigma$. These events cannot be modified by the EM, i.e. they cannot be suppressed nor buffered, so they must be emitted

by the EM whenever they are received. Let us note $\Sigma_c = \Sigma \setminus \Sigma_u$ the set of controllable events, which are on the scope of the EM. The EM can decide to buffer them to delay their emission, but it cannot suppress them (nevertheless, it can delay them endlessly, keeping their order unchanged). Thus, the EM may interleave controllable and uncontrollable events.

3.1 Enforcement Functions and their Requirements

An enforcement function is a description of the input/output behavior of an EM. Formally, we define *enforcement functions* as follows:

Definition 2 (Enforcement function). *Given an alphabet of actions Σ , an enforcement function is a function $E : \Sigma^* \rightarrow \Sigma^*$, i.e. a function that modifies an execution.*

As stated previously, the usual purpose of an EM is to ensure that the executions of a running system satisfy a property, thus its enforcement function has to be *sound*, meaning that its output always satisfies the property:

Definition 3 (Soundness). *E is sound with respect to φ if $\forall \sigma \in \Sigma^*, E(\sigma) \models \varphi$.*

The usual notion of *transparency* in enforcement monitoring [21,15] states that the output of an enforcement function is the longest prefix of the input satisfying the property. The name “transparency” stems from the fact that correct executions are left unchanged. However, because of uncontrollable events, events may be released in a different order from the one they are received. Therefore, transparency can not be ensured, and we define the weaker notion of *compliance*.

Definition 4 (Compliance). *E is compliant w.r.t. Σ_u and Σ_c , noted $\text{compliant}(E, \Sigma_c, \Sigma_u)$, if $\forall \sigma \in \Sigma^*, E(\sigma)|_{\Sigma_c} \preceq \sigma|_{\Sigma_c} \wedge \forall u \in \Sigma_u, E(\sigma).u \preceq E(\sigma.u)$.*

Intuitively, compliance states that the EM does not change the order of the controllable events and emits uncontrollable events immediately upon their reception, possibly followed by stored controllable events. When clear from the context, the partition is not mentioned: E is said to be compliant.

We say that a property is *enforceable* whenever there exists a compliant function that is sound with respect to that property.

Example 1. Figure 1a depicts property φ_{ex} which states that writing to a shared storage device should be authenticated and is authorized only when the device is not locked. φ_{ex} is not enforceable if the uncontrollable alphabet is $\{\textit{LockOn}, \textit{LockOff}\}$ ⁶ since reading the word *LockOn* from l_0 leads to l_3 , which is not an accepting location. However, the existence of such a word does not imply that it is impossible to enforce this property for some other input words. If word *Auth* is read, then location l_1 is reached, and from this location, it is possible to enforce φ_{ex} by emitting *Write* only when in location l_1 .

⁶ Uncontrollable events are emphasized in italics.

3.2 Synthesizing Enforcement Functions

Example 1 shows that some input words cannot be corrected by the EM, because of uncontrollable events. This leads us to define another property that captures the sequences that can be input to an EM while ensuring soundness.

Definition 5 (Pre, Enf).

- $\text{Pre}(\varphi) = \langle Q, q_0, \Sigma, \rightarrow', Q_{\text{enf}} \rangle$, with

$$\rightarrow' = (\rightarrow \cap Q_{\text{enf}} \times \Sigma \times Q) \cup \{(q, a, q) \mid q \in Q_{\text{enf}} \wedge a \in \Sigma\}$$

- $\text{Enf}(\varphi) = \langle Q, q_0, \Sigma, \rightarrow, Q_{\text{enf}} \rangle$.

where $Q_{\text{enf}} = \{q \in F \mid (q \text{ after } \Sigma_u^*) \subseteq F\}$, $Q_{\text{enf}} = Q \setminus Q_{\text{enf}}$.

Q_{enf} is the set of accepting locations of \mathcal{A}_φ from which it is impossible to reach a non-accepting location by reading only uncontrollable events, and thus possible to enforce the property (since it is possible to indefinitely delay all controllable events to ensure the property).

Intuitively, $\text{Pre}(\varphi)$ is the property specifying whether it is possible to enforce φ from a location that has already been reached by triggering the output sequence of the enforcement mechanism (i.e. a location reached by a prefix of the output) or not. Thus, it can be used to know if soundness is guaranteed or not (i.e. if a location from Q_{enf} has been reached). Since the enforcement mechanism ensures that soundness is satisfied as soon as possible, $\text{Pre}(\varphi)$ is a co-safety property, because once Q_{enf} is reached, φ can be ensured from then.

Example 2. For property φ_{ex} , $Q_{\text{enf}} = \{l_1, l_2\}$, and $\text{Pre}(\varphi_{\text{ex}})$ is the property represented by the automaton in Fig. 1b.

Since it is not possible to enforce φ from locations in $Q \setminus Q_{\text{enf}}$, (because uncontrollable events could lead to a location in $Q \setminus F$ trapped with uncontrollable events), an enforcement function should try to always be able to reach locations in Q_{enf} to ensure soundness. Thus, property $\text{Enf}(\varphi)$ holds on a sequence whenever Q_{enf} is reached in \mathcal{A}_φ with this sequence. Since $Q_{\text{enf}} \subseteq F$, satisfying $\text{Enf}(\varphi)$ is sufficient to satisfy φ . Thus, we shall enforce $\text{Enf}(\varphi)$.

Based on the above definition and the enforcement limitation illustrated in Example 1, we synthesise an enforcement function for φ that is compliant, and sound w.r.t. a property that is as close as possible to φ (see later Propositions 1 and 2).

Definition 6 ($\text{store}_\varphi, E_\varphi$).⁷ Function $\text{store}_\varphi : \Sigma^* \rightarrow \Sigma^* \times \Sigma^*$ is defined as follows:

- $\text{store}_\varphi(\epsilon) = (\epsilon, \epsilon)$;
- for $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$ and $a \in \Sigma$, let $(\sigma_s, \sigma_c) = \text{store}_\varphi(\sigma)$, then:

$$\text{store}_\varphi(\sigma.a) = \begin{cases} (\sigma_s.a.\sigma'_s, \sigma'_c) & \text{if } a \in \Sigma_u \\ (\sigma_s.\sigma''_s, \sigma''_c) & \text{if } a \in \Sigma_c \end{cases}, \text{ where:}$$

$$\sigma'_s = \max_{\preceq}(\{w \preceq \sigma_c \mid \sigma_s.a.w \models \text{Enf}(\varphi)\}),$$

⁷ E_φ and store_φ depend on Σ_u and Σ_c , but we did not add them in order to lighten the notations.

$$\begin{aligned}\sigma'_c &= \sigma_s'^{-1}.\sigma_c, \\ \sigma_s'' &= \begin{cases} \epsilon & \text{if } \sigma_s.\sigma_c.a \not\models \text{Enf}(\varphi), \\ \sigma_c.a & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \\ \sigma_c'' &= \sigma_s''^{-1}.\sigma_c.a.\end{aligned}$$

The enforcement function $E_\varphi : \Sigma^* \rightarrow \Sigma^*$ is s.t. for $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$, $E_\varphi(\sigma) = \Pi_1(\text{store}_\varphi(\sigma))$.

Intuitively, σ_s is the word that can be released as output, whereas σ_c is the buffer containing the events that are already read/received, but cannot be released as output yet because they lead to an unsafe location from which it would be possible to violate the property reading only uncontrollable events. If σ_s satisfies $\text{Pre}(\varphi)$, then the output will always satisfy the property afterwards.

Upon receiving a new action a , it is output if it belongs to Σ_u , followed by the longest prefix of σ_c that leads to Q_{enf} . If the a is controllable, $\sigma_c.a$ is output if it leads to Q_{enf} , else a is added to the buffer. Property $\text{Enf}(\varphi)$ is used instead of φ to ensure that the output of the enforcement function always leads to locations in Q_{enf} , so that the property will still be satisfied (if it was) upon receiving uncontrollable events.

Enforcement functions as per Definition 6 are sound and compliant.

Proposition 1. E_φ is sound with respect to $\text{Pre}(\varphi) \implies \varphi$, as per Definition 3.

Proposition 2. E_φ is compliant, as per Definition 4.

Notice that for some properties, blocking all controllable events may still satisfy soundness and compliance. However, for any given input σ , $E_\varphi(\sigma)$ is the longest possible word that ensures to reach Q_{enf} . Controllable events are blocked only when it is not certain that Q_{enf} will be reached.

3.3 Enforcement Monitors

Enforcement monitors are operational descriptions of enforcement mechanisms. Here, we give a representation of the previous enforcement function as a transition system whose output should be exactly the output of the enforcement function defined in sections 3.1 and 3.2. The purpose is to ease the implementation, since this representation is closer to the real behavior of a monitor.

Definition 7 (Enforcement monitor). An enforcement monitor \mathcal{E} for φ is a transition system $\langle C^\mathcal{E}, c_0^\mathcal{E}, \Gamma^\mathcal{E}, \hookrightarrow_\mathcal{E} \rangle$ such that:

- $C^\mathcal{E} = Q \times \Sigma^*$ is the set of configurations.
- $c_0^\mathcal{E} = \langle q_0, \epsilon \rangle$ is the initial configuration.
- $\Gamma^\mathcal{E} = \Sigma^* \times \{\text{dump}(\cdot), \text{pass-uncont}(\cdot), \text{store-cont}(\cdot)\} \times \Sigma^*$ is the alphabet, where the first, second, and third members are an input, an operation, and an output, respectively.
- $\hookrightarrow_\mathcal{E} \subseteq C^\mathcal{E} \times \Gamma^\mathcal{E} \times C^\mathcal{E}$ is the transition relation, defined as the smallest relation obtained by applying the following rules in order (where $w / \bowtie / w'$ stands for $(w, \bowtie, w') \in \Gamma^\mathcal{E}$):

- **dump**: $\langle q, \sigma.\sigma_c \rangle \xrightarrow{\epsilon/\text{dump}(\sigma)/\sigma} \langle q', \sigma_c \rangle$, with $q \xrightarrow{\sigma} q'$, and $q' \in Q_{\text{enf}}$,
- **pass-uncont**: $\langle q, \sigma_c \rangle \xrightarrow{a/\text{pass-uncont}(a)/a} \langle q', \sigma_c \rangle$, with $a \in \Sigma_u$ and $q \xrightarrow{a} q'$,
- **store-cont**: $\langle q, \sigma_c \rangle \xrightarrow{a/\text{store-cont}(a)/\epsilon} \langle q, \sigma_c.a \rangle$.

Rule **dump** outputs a prefix of the word in memory (the buffer) whenever it is possible to ensure soundness afterwards. Rule **pass-uncont** releases an uncontrollable event as soon as it is received. Rule **store-cont** simply adds a controllable event at the end of the buffer. Compared to section 3.2, the second member of the configuration represents buffer σ_c in the definition of store_φ , whereas σ_s is here represented by location q which is the first member of the configuration, such that $q = \text{Reach}(\sigma_s)$.

Proposition 3. *The output of the enforcement monitor \mathcal{E} for input σ is $E_\varphi(\sigma)$*

Remark 1. Enforcement monitors as per Definition 7 are somewhat similar to the ones in [13], except that we choose to explicitly keep the memory as part of the configuration and get uniform definitions in the untimed and timed settings (see Section 4). Hence, enforcement monitors as per Definition 7 can also equivalently be defined using a finite-state machine, extending the definition in [13].

4 Enforcement Monitoring of Timed Properties

In this section, we extend the framework presented in section 3 to enforce timed properties. Enforcement mechanisms and their properties should be redefined. Enforcement functions need an extra parameter representing the date at which the output is observed. Soundness has to be adapted because, at any time instant, one has to allow the property not to hold, provided that it will hold in the future.

Considering uncontrollable events with timed properties raises several difficulties. First, the order of the events might be modified. Thus, previous definitions of transparency ([19]), stating that the output of an enforcement function will eventually be a delayed prefix of the input, can not be used in this situation. Moreover, when delaying some events to have the property satisfied in the future, one must consider the fact that some uncontrollable events could occur at any moment (and cannot be delayed). Finally, some properties enforceable in [18] cannot be enforced using uncontrollable events, meaning that it is impossible to ensure the soundness of our enforcement mechanisms, as shown in Example 3. It could be possible to use the same definition of soundness as in section 3, where the output always satisfies the property, but then soundness would have been ensured for less properties (i.e. only for safety properties). Weakening soundness allows to enforce more properties, and to let enforcement mechanisms produce longer outputs.

In this section, φ is a timed property defined by a deterministic and complete timed automaton $\mathcal{A}_\varphi = \langle L, l_0, X, \Sigma, \Delta, G \rangle$ with semantics $\llbracket \mathcal{A}_\varphi \rrbracket = \langle Q, q_0, \Gamma, \rightarrow, F_G \rangle$.

4.1 Enforcement Functions and their Properties

An enforcement function takes a timed word and the current time as input, and outputs a timed word:




Fig. 2: A timed property enforceable if $\Sigma_u = \emptyset$.

Definition 8 (Enforcement Function). An enforcement function is a function from $\text{tw}(\Sigma) \times \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ to $\text{tw}(\Sigma)$.

As for the untimed case, we define the notions of *soundness* and *compliance*.

Definition 9 (Soundness). An enforcement function E is sound w.r.t. φ if $\forall \sigma \in \text{tw}(\Sigma)$, $\forall t \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$, $\exists t' \geq t$, $E(\sigma, t') \models \varphi$.

Definition 10 (Compliance). An enforcement function E is compliant if $\forall \sigma \in \text{tw}(\Sigma)$, $\forall t \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$, $\exists t' \geq t$, $E(\sigma, t')|_{\Sigma_u} = \sigma|_{\Sigma_u} \wedge \sigma|_{\Sigma_c} \preceq_d E(\sigma, t')|_{\Sigma_c}$.

An enforcement function is sound if for any input timed word, at any time instant, the value of the enforcement function satisfies the property in the future. Compliance is similar to the untimed setting but there are noteworthy differences. First, controllable events can be delayed. Moreover, since timing information is attached to events, it is not necessary to consider an event of Σ_u . Indeed, the dates of uncontrollable events are the same in the input and in the output, meaning that they are emitted immediately upon their reception. Compliance states that controllable events can be delayed, but their order must be preserved by the enforcement mechanism (i.e. when considering the projections on controllable events, the output should be a delayed prefix of the input). Regarding uncontrollable events, any uncontrollable event is released immediately when received (i.e. when considering the projections on uncontrollable events, the output should be equal to the input).

As in the untimed setting, we say that a property is *enforceable* whenever there exists a sound and compliant enforcement function for this property.

4.2 Synthesizing an Enforcement Function

Example 3 (Non enforceable property). Consider the property defined by the automaton in Fig. 2 with alphabet $\Sigma = \{a, b\}$. If all actions are controllable ($\Sigma_u = \emptyset$), the property is enforceable because one needs to delay events until clock x exceeds 2. Otherwise, the property is not enforceable. For instance, if $\Sigma_u = \{a\}$, word $(1, a)$ cannot be corrected.

We define a property $\text{Pre}(\varphi)$, indicating whether it is possible to enforce property φ .

Definition 11 (Pre). Property $\text{Pre}(\varphi)$ is defined as the timed property which semantics is $\langle Q, q_0, \Gamma, \rightarrow', Q_{\text{enf}} \rangle$ where:

- $Q_{\text{enf}}(\varphi) = \{q \in F_G \mid (q \text{ after } \text{tw}(\Sigma_u)) \subseteq F_G\}$,
- $Q_{\text{enf}}^{\neg}(\varphi) = Q \setminus Q_{\text{enf}}(\varphi)$,

$$- \rightarrow' = (\rightarrow \cap Q_{\text{enf}} \times \Gamma \times Q) \cup \{(q, \gamma, q) \mid q \in Q_{\text{enf}} \wedge \gamma \in \Gamma\}.$$

$Q_{\text{enf}}(\varphi)$ is the set of states of $\llbracket \mathcal{A}_\varphi \rrbracket$ from which it is impossible to reach a bad state reading only uncontrollable events. Thus, it corresponds to the set of states from which it is possible to enforce the property under consideration. Q_{enf}^- is the set of states of the semantics of φ from which it is not possible to enforce the property, because there is a timed word containing only uncontrollable events (which cannot be modified nor suppressed) leading to a state that is not accepting. In the following, $Q_{\text{enf}}(\varphi)$ is noted Q_{enf} and $Q_{\text{enf}}^-(\varphi)$ is noted Q_{enf}^- to ease the notation.

$\text{Pre}(\varphi)$ is a property indicating whether it is possible to enforce φ from the state of the semantics reached after reading a timed word (i.e. every possible continuation leads to Q_{enf}). Note that once Q_{enf} is reached, enforcement becomes effective, then the property will always be satisfied in the future, which explains why $\text{Pre}(\varphi)$ is a co-safety property.

Note that, unlike in the untimed case, Q_{enf} , Q_{enf}^- and $\text{Pre}(\varphi)$ are defined on the semantics of the automaton representing the property and not on the automaton itself. Indeed, the set of states in the semantics in the untimed setting is the same as the set of locations of the property, thus the use of the semantics is not necessary.

We also define function Safe which, given a state, returns the set of sequences of controllable events that can be emitted safely. Function Safe is then extended to words:

Definition 12 (Safe (states)).

- Given a state q of the semantics of a timed automaton,

$$\text{Safe}(q) = \{\sigma \in \Sigma_c^* \mid \forall w \in \text{tw}(\Sigma), \Pi_\Sigma(w|_{\Sigma_c}) \preceq \sigma \implies \exists w' \in \text{tw}(\Sigma), w \preceq w' \wedge \Pi_\Sigma(w'|_{\Sigma_c}) \preceq \sigma \wedge \exists q' \in Q_{\text{enf}}, q \xrightarrow{w'} q'\}.$$
- Given a word $\sigma \in \text{tw}(\Sigma)$, $\text{Safe}(\sigma) = \text{Safe}(q)$, with $q = \text{Reach}(\sigma)$.

Intuitively, $\text{Safe}(q)$ is the set of sequences of controllable events for which it is always possible to compute dates to reach Q_{enf} , even if any uncontrollable event occurs at any time. Safe shall be used to determine if the enforcement mechanism can release some previously-received controllable events. Contrary to the untimed case, some delay between two consecutive events may be needed to satisfy the property, thus an uncontrollable event could be received by the enforcement mechanism while the delay elapses. Should this happen, the enforcement mechanism needs to compute again the dates for the events it has not output yet in order to reach Q_{enf} if possible. Safe is used to ensure this, i.e. that Q_{enf} remains reachable with the events that have not been output yet even if some uncontrollable events occur.

Let us now define an enforcement function for a timed property φ , denoted as E_φ .

Definition 13 (E_φ). Let store_φ be the function defined inductively by $\text{store}_\varphi(\epsilon) = (\epsilon, \epsilon, \epsilon)$, and for $\sigma \in \text{tw}(\Sigma)$, and (t, a) such that $\sigma.(t, a) \in \text{tw}(\Sigma)$, if $(\sigma_s, \sigma_b, \sigma_c) = \text{store}_\varphi(\sigma)$, then

$$\text{store}_\varphi(\sigma.(t, a)) = \begin{cases} (\sigma'_s, \sigma'_b, \sigma'_c) & \text{if } a \in \Sigma_u, \\ (\sigma_s \cdot \text{obs}(\sigma_b, t), \sigma''_b, \sigma''_c) & \text{if } a \in \Sigma_c, \end{cases}$$

with:

$$\begin{aligned}
\kappa_\varphi(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, t) &= \min_{\text{lex}}(\max_{\preceq}(\{w \mid \Pi_\Sigma(w) \preceq \sigma_2 \wedge \text{date}(w(1)) \geq t \wedge \Pi_\Sigma(w) \in \\
&\text{Safe}(\sigma_1) \wedge \exists q_i \in \text{Reach}(\sigma_1), q_i \xrightarrow{w} q_{\text{enf}} \in Q_{\text{enf}}\})). \\
\sigma'_s &= \sigma_s \cdot \text{obs}(\sigma_b, t) \cdot (t, a), \\
\sigma_{b_1} &= \text{nobs}(\sigma_b, t), \\
\sigma'_b &= \kappa_\varphi(\sigma'_s, \Pi_\Sigma(\sigma_{b_1}) \cdot \sigma_c, t) +_t \text{time}(\sigma'_s), \\
\sigma'_c &= \Pi_\Sigma(\sigma'_b)^{-1} \cdot (\Pi_\Sigma(\sigma_{b_1}) \cdot \sigma_c), \\
\sigma''_b &= \kappa_\varphi(\sigma_s \cdot \text{obs}(\sigma_b, t), \Pi_\Sigma(\sigma_{b_1}) \cdot \sigma_c \cdot a, t) +_t \text{time}(\sigma_s \cdot \text{obs}(\sigma_b, t)), \\
\sigma''_c &= \Pi_\Sigma(\sigma''_b)^{-1} \cdot (\Pi_\Sigma(\sigma_{b_1}) \cdot \sigma_c \cdot a),
\end{aligned}$$

For $\sigma \in \text{tw}(\Sigma)$, we define $E_\varphi(\sigma, t) = \text{obs}(\Pi_1(s_\sigma) \cdot \Pi_2(s_\sigma), t)$, with $s_\sigma = \text{store}_\varphi(\sigma)$.

In the definition of store_φ , the actions of the input belong to one of the three words σ_s , σ_b and σ_c . Word σ_s represents what has already been output and cannot be modified anymore. The timed word σ_b contains the controllable events that are about to be output, such that if σ_b is concatenated to σ_s , the concatenation satisfies φ . The untimed word σ_c contains the controllable actions that remain, meaning that, whatever dates are associated to these actions, it is not sure that Q_{enf} would be reached if it was emitted after σ_b . Yet, the actions of σ_c might be released later (because of the occurrence of an uncontrollable event for instance). Thus it is used to compute the new values for σ_b and σ_c when needed. Note that only the events of σ_c are stored with no dates. Indeed, σ_c is used only when recomputing dates, thus there is not any date to associate to the events in σ_c . κ_φ is computable: even though the number of words satisfying $\Pi_\Sigma(w) \preceq \sigma_2$ is infinite, since there is an infinite number of possible dates, it is possible to consider only a finite number of words, by considering only words that lead to different regions [1] of the automaton. Moreover, checking if $\Pi_\Sigma(w) \in \text{Safe}(\sigma_1)$ is also computable, because it is a reachability issue, that is computable in the region automaton.

Roughly speaking, the enforcement mechanism described in the previous definition waits for the controllable events of the input to belong to the safe words of the current state, reached with the uncontrollable events (i.e. in $\sigma_c \in \text{Safe}(q)$ if q is the current state), and then starts to emit as many controllable events as possible, with minimum dates greater than the current time. Since the input is safe, Q_{enf} will be reached at some point in the future, and then the enforcement mechanism starts again to wait for the input to be safe for the state reached so far, and goes on like previously.

Proposition 4. E_φ is sound with respect to $\text{Pre}(\varphi) \implies \varphi$, as per Definition 9.

Proposition 5. E_φ is compliant, as per Definition 10.

4.3 Enforcement Monitors

As in the untimed setting, we give here an operational description of an enforcement mechanism whose output is exactly the output of E_φ , as defined in Definition 13.

Definition 14. An enforcement monitor \mathcal{E} for φ is a transition system $\langle C^\mathcal{E}, c_0^\mathcal{E}, \Gamma^\mathcal{E}, \xrightarrow{\mathcal{E}} \rangle$ such that:

- $C^\mathcal{E} = \text{tw}(\Sigma) \times \Sigma_c^* \times Q \times \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ is the set of configurations.
- $c_0^\mathcal{E} = \langle \epsilon, \epsilon, q_0, 0 \rangle \in C^\mathcal{E}$ is the initial configuration.

- $\Gamma^{\mathcal{E}} = ((\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \times \Sigma) \cup \{\epsilon\}) \times Op \times ((\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \times \Sigma) \cup \{\epsilon\})$ is the alphabet, composed of an optional input, an operation and an optional output. The set of operations is $\{\text{dump}(\cdot), \text{pass-uncont}(\cdot), \text{store-cont}(\cdot), \text{delay}(\cdot)\}$. Whenever $(\sigma, \bowtie, \sigma') \in \Gamma^{\mathcal{E}}$, it is noted $\sigma / \bowtie / \sigma'$.
- $\hookrightarrow_{\mathcal{E}}$ is the transition relation defined as the smallest relation obtained by applying the following rules given by their priority order:
 - **Dump:** $\langle (t_b, a) \cdot \sigma_b, \sigma_c, q, t \rangle \xrightarrow{\epsilon / \text{dump}(t_b, a) / (t_b, a)} \langle \sigma_b, \sigma_c, q', t \rangle$ if $t_b = t$ with $q \xrightarrow{(t_b, a)} q'$,
 - **Pass-uncont:** $\langle \sigma_b, \sigma_c, q, t \rangle \xrightarrow{(t, a) / \text{pass-uncont}(t, a) / (t, a)} \langle \sigma'_b, \sigma'_c, q', t \rangle$, with $q \xrightarrow{(t, a)} q'$ and $(\sigma'_b, \sigma'_c) = \text{update}(q, \sigma_b, \sigma_c, t)$,
 - **Store-cont:** $\langle \sigma_b, \sigma_c, q, t \rangle \xrightarrow{(t, c) / \text{store-cont}((t, c)) / \epsilon} \langle \sigma'_b, \sigma'_c, q, t \rangle$, with $(\sigma'_b, \sigma'_c) = \text{update}(q, \sigma_b, \sigma_c.c, t)$,
 - **Delay:** $\langle \sigma_b, \sigma_c, (l, v), t \rangle \xrightarrow{\epsilon / \text{delay}(\delta) / \epsilon} \langle \sigma_b, \sigma_c, (l, v + \delta), t + \delta \rangle$,
 where update is a function computing κ_{φ} from previous definition of E_{φ} .

In a configuration $\langle \sigma_b, \sigma_c, q, t \rangle$, σ_b is the word to be output as time elapses; σ_c is what is left from the input; q is the state of the semantics reached after reading what has already been output; t is the current time instant, i.e. the time elapsed since the beginning of the run.

Sequences σ_b and σ_c are as in the definition of store_{φ} , whereas q represents σ_s , such that $q = \text{Reach}(\sigma_s)$. Function update computes the values of σ_b and σ_c to ensure soundness. Function update represents the computation of function κ_{φ} in the definition of store_{φ} .

Proposition 6. *The output of \mathcal{E} for input σ is $E_{\varphi}(\sigma)$.*

4.4 Example

Figure 3 depicts a property modeling the use of some shared writable device. One can get the status of a lock through the uncontrollable events LockOn and LockOff indicating that the lock has been acquired, and that it is available, respectively. The uncontrollable event Auth is sent by the device to authorize writings. Once event Auth is received, the controllable event Write can be sent after having waited a little bit for synchronization. Each time the lock is acquired and released, we must also wait before issuing a new Write order. The sets of events are: $\Sigma_c = \{\text{Write}\}$ and $\Sigma_u = \{\text{Auth}, \text{LockOff}, \text{LockOn}\}$.

Let us follow the output of function store_{φ} over time with the following input word: $\sigma = (1, \text{Auth}). (2, \text{LockOn}). (4, \text{Write}). (5, \text{LockOff}). (6, \text{LockOn}). (7, \text{Write}). (8, \text{LockOff})$. Let $(\sigma_s, \sigma_b, \sigma_c) = \text{store}_{\varphi}(\text{obs}(\sigma, t))$. Table 1 gives the values taken by σ_s , σ_b , and σ_c over time. To compute them, first notice that $Q_{\text{enf}} = \{l_1, l_2\} \times \mathcal{V}(\{x\})$. Moreover, we can see that $\text{Write} \in \text{Safe}(l_1)$ because it is always possible to delay the Write event in such a way that the current state remains in Q_{enf} , whatever are the uncontrollable events. Consequently, whenever σ_s leads to l_1 , σ_b is empty (because Write is the only controllable event, thus σ_b must start with a Write event).




Fig. 3: Property modeling writes on a shared storage device

Figure 4 shows the execution of the enforcement monitor with input $(1, Auth)$. $(2, LockOn)$. $(4, Write)$. $(5, LockOff)$. $(6, LockOn)$. $(7, Write)$. $(8, LockOff)$. In a configuration, the input is on the right, the output on the left, and the middle is the current configuration of the enforcement monitor. Variable t keeps track of global time. A valuation is represented as an integer – the value of the (unique) clock x . Observe that the final output at $t = 10$ is the same as the one of the enforcement function: $(1, Auth)$. $(2, LockOn)$. $(5, LockOff)$. $(6, LockOn)$. $(8, LockOff)$. $(10, Write)$. $(10, Write)$

5 Related Work

Runtime enforcement was pioneered by Schneider with security automata [21], a runtime mechanism for enforcing safety properties. In this work monitors are able to stop the execution of the system once a deviation of the property has been detected. Later, Ligatti et al. proposed edit-automata, a more powerful model of enforcement monitors able to introduce and suppress events from the execution. Later, more general models were proposed where the monitors can be synthesized from regular properties [13]. More recently, Bloem et al. [6] presented a framework to synthesize enforcement monitors for reactive systems, called as *shields*, from a set of safety properties. A shield acts instantaneously and cannot buffer actions. Whenever a property violation is unavoidable, the shield allows to deviate from the property for k consecutive steps (as in [7]). Whenever a second violation occurs within k steps, then the shield enters into a *fail-safe* mode, where it ensures only correctness. Another recent approach by Dolzhenko et al [11] introduces Mandatory Result Automata (MRAs). MRAs extend edit-automata by refining the input-output relationship of an enforcement mechanism and thus allowing a more precise description of the enforcement abilities of an enforcement mechanism in concrete application scenarios. All the previously mentioned approaches considered untimed specifications, and do not consider uncontrollable events.

$t = 0$ $\epsilon / (\epsilon, \epsilon, (l_0, 0), 0) / (1, Auth). (2, on). (4, w). (5, off). (6, on). (7, w). (8, off)$
 $\downarrow \text{delay}(1)$
 $t = 1$ $\epsilon / (\epsilon, \epsilon, (l_0, 1), 1) / (1, Auth). (2, on). (4, w). (5, off). (6, on). (7, w). (8, off)$
 $\downarrow \text{pass-uncont}((1, Auth))$
 $t = 1$ $(1, Auth) / (\epsilon, \epsilon, (l_1, 1), 1) / (2, on). (4, w). (5, off). (6, on). (7, w). (8, off)$
 $\downarrow \text{delay}(1)$
 $t = 2$ $(1, Auth) / (\epsilon, \epsilon, (l_1, 2), 2) / (2, on). (4, w). (5, off). (6, on). (7, w). (8, off)$
 $\downarrow \text{pass-uncont}((2, on))$
 $t = 2$ $(1, Auth). (2, on) / (\epsilon, \epsilon, (l_2, 2), 2) / (4, w). (5, off). (6, on). (7, w). (8, off)$
 $\downarrow \text{delay}(2)$
 $t = 4$ $(1, Auth). (2, on) / (\epsilon, \epsilon, (l_2, 4), 4) / (4, w). (5, off). (6, on). (7, w). (8, off)$
 $\downarrow \text{store-cont}((4, w))$
 $t = 4$ $(1, Auth). (2, on) / (\epsilon, (4, w), (l_2, 4), 4) / (5, off). (6, on). (7, w). (8, off)$
 $\downarrow \text{delay}(1)$
 $t = 5$ $(1, Auth). (2, on) / (\epsilon, (4, w), (l_2, 5), 5) / (5, off). (6, on). (7, w). (8, off)$
 $\downarrow \text{pass-uncont}((5, off))$
 $t = 5$ $(1, Auth). (2, on). (5, off) / ((7, w), \epsilon, (l_1, 0), 5) / (6, on). (7, w). (8, off)$
 $\downarrow \text{delay}(1)$
 $t = 6$ $(1, Auth). (2, on). (5, off) / ((7, w), \epsilon, (l_1, 1), 6) / (6, on). (7, w). (8, off)$
 $\downarrow \text{pass-uncont}((6, on))$
 $t = 6$ $(1, Auth). (2, on). (5, off). (6, on) / (\epsilon, (7, w), (l_2, 1), 6) / (7, w). (8, off)$
 $\downarrow \text{delay}(1)$
 $t = 7$ $(1, Auth). (2, on). (5, off). (6, on) / (\epsilon, (7, w), (l_2, 2), 7) / (7, w). (8, off)$
 $\downarrow \text{store-cont}((7, w))$
 $t = 7$ $(1, Auth). (2, on). (5, off). (6, on) / (\epsilon, (7, w), (7, w), (l_2, 2), 7) / (8, off)$
 $\downarrow \text{delay}(1)$
 $t = 8$ $(1, Auth). (2, on). (5, off). (6, on) / (\epsilon, (7, w). (7, w), (l_2, 3), 8) / (8, off)$
 $\downarrow \text{pass-uncont}((8, off))$
 $t = 8$ $(1, Auth). (2, on). (5, off). (6, on). (8, off) / ((10, w). (10, w), \epsilon, (l_1, 0), 8) / \epsilon$
 $\downarrow \text{delay}(2)$
 $t = 10$ $(1, Auth). (2, on). (5, off). (6, on). (8, off) / ((10, w). (10, w), \epsilon, (l_1, 2), 10) / \epsilon$
 $\downarrow \text{dump}((10, w))$
 $t = 10$ $(1, Auth). (2, on). (5, off). (6, on). (8, off). (10, w) / ((10, w), \epsilon, (l_1, 2), 10) / \epsilon$
 $\downarrow \text{dump}((10, w))$
 $t = 10$ $(1, Auth). (2, on). (5, off). (6, on). (8, off). (10, w). (10, w) / (\epsilon, \epsilon, (l_1, 2), 10) / \epsilon$

Fig. 4: Execution of an enforcement monitor with input $(1, Auth)$. $(2, LockOn)$. $(4, Write)$. $(5, LockOff)$. $(6, LockOn)$. $(7, Write)$. $(8, LockOff)$. $LockOff$ is abbreviated as off , $LockOn$ as on , and $Write$ as w

Table 1: Values of $(\sigma_s, \sigma_b, \sigma_c) = \text{store}_\varphi((1, \text{Auth}). (2, \text{LockOn}). (4, \text{Write}). (5, \text{LockOff}). (6, \text{LockOn}). (7, \text{Write}). (8, \text{LockOff}))$ over time.

t	σ_s	σ_b	σ_c
1	(1, Auth)	ϵ	ϵ
2	(1, Auth).(2, LockOn)	ϵ	ϵ
4	(1, Auth).(2, LockOn)	ϵ	Write
5	(1, Auth).(2, LockOn).(5, LockOff)	(7, Write)	ϵ
6	(1, Auth).(2, LockOn).(5, LockOff). (6, LockOn)	ϵ	Write
7	(1, Auth).(2, LockOn).(5, LockOff). (6, LockOn)	ϵ	Write . Write
8	(1, Auth).(2, LockOn).(5, LockOff). (6, LockOn).(8, LockOff)	(10, Write).(10, Write)	ϵ
10	(1, Auth).(2, LockOn).(5, LockOff). (6, LockOn).(8, LockOff).(10, Write). (10, Write)	ϵ	ϵ

In the timed setting, several monitoring tools for timed specifications have been proposed. RT-Mac [20] permits to verify at runtime timeliness and reliability correctness. LARVA [8,9] takes as input safety properties expressed with DATEs (Dynamic Automata with Times and Events), a timed model similar to timed automata.

In previous work, we introduced *runtime enforcement for timed properties* [19] specified by timed automata [1]. We proposed a model of enforcement monitors that work as *delayers*, that is, mechanisms that are able to delay the input sequence of timed events to correct it. While [19] proposed synthesis techniques only for safety and co-safety properties, we then generalized the framework to synthesize an enforcement monitor for any regular timed property [17,18]. In [16], we considered parametric timed properties, that is timed properties with data-events containing information from the execution of the monitored system. None of our previous research endeavors considered uncontrollable events. Considering uncontrollable events entailed us to revisit and redefine all the notions related to enforcement mechanisms (soundness, transparency weaken into compliance, enforcement function, and enforcement monitor). Moreover, we define an enforcement condition as a property, that allows to determine when an enforcement mechanism can safely output controllable events, independently of the uncontrollable events that can be received by the enforcement mechanism.

Basin et al. [4] introduced uncontrollable events in safety properties enforced with security automata [21]. More recently, Basin et al. proposed a more general approach [3] related to enforcement of security policies with controllable and uncontrollable events. Basin et al. presented several complexity results and showed how to synthesize enforcement mechanisms. In case of violation of the property, the system stops the execution. The approaches in [4,3] only handle discrete time, and clock ticks are considered as uncontrollable events. In our framework, we consider dense time using the expressiveness of timed automata. We synthesize enforcement mechanisms for any regular property, and not just safety properties. Moreover, our monitor are more flexible since they block

the input word only when delaying events cannot prevent the violation of the desired property, thus offering the possibility to correct violations due to the timing of events.

6 Conclusion and Future Work

This paper extends the research endeavors on runtime enforcement and focuses on the use of uncontrollable events. An enforcement mechanism can only observe uncontrollable events, but cannot delay nor suppress them. Considering uncontrollable events entails to change the order between controllable and uncontrollable events, and to adapt the usual requirements on enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, we weaken transparency into compliance. We define enforcement mechanisms at two levels of abstraction (enforcement functions and enforcement monitors), for regular properties and regular timed properties. Since not all properties can be enforced, we also give a condition, depending on the property and the input word, indicating whether or not the enforcement mechanism can be sound with respect to the property under scrutiny. An enforcement mechanism outputs all received uncontrollable events, and stores the controllable ones, until soundness can be guaranteed. Then, it outputs events only when it can ensure that soundness will be satisfied.

Several extensions of this work are possible. A first extension is to consider more risky strategies regarding uncontrollable events, outputting events even if some uncontrollable events could lead to a bad state. Following such strategies could be guided by an additional probabilistic model on the occurrence of input events. A second extension is to implement the enforcement mechanisms using UPPAAL libraries [14]. A third extension is to use runtime enforcement to modify at runtime the parameters of a system with stochastic behavior, as done offline in [2]. A fourth extension is to define a theory of runtime enforcement for distributed systems where enforcement monitors are decentralised on the components of the verified system, as is the case with verification monitors in [5]. A fifth extension is to distinguish inputs from outputs in properties, and consider for instance timed i/o automata [10] to formalise properties.

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